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In 2006, in response to the unforeseen consequences of the 
Clinton administration’s “One Strike Policy,” Congress amended the 
Fair Housing Act (FHA) through the Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA) to prevent eviction of domestic violence victims based on the 
violence committed against them. Since then, victims of domestic 
violence who live in private housing have continued to be evicted 
under crime-free housing ordinances and lease provisions which 
punish victims for the acts of their abusers. Until now, the only 
defenses offered to these evictions were brought under theories of 
disparate treatment and disparate impact. Courts have yet to decide 
the legality of these crime-free housing ordinances but commentators 
have mistakenly read the FHA to protect only those domestic violence 
victims living in public housing, leaving victims living in private 
housing with no protection under the FHA. This article explains why 
the provision in the FHA, by its plain meaning, applies to domestic 
violence victims in private and public housing. Moreover, I argue 
municipal crime-free housing ordinances are preempted, as a result of 
the express preemption provision in the FHA, and cannot be used to 
evict domestic violence victims. This new reading of 42 U.S.C. §1437f 
and the preemption argument outlined in the article are timely 
arguments because the reliability of disparate treatment and disparate 
impact claims under the FHA has been questioned following the 
Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Magner v. Gallagher. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This comment considers whether municipal crime-free housing 
ordinances, as applied to the class of cases involving domestic 
violence, are preempted by the Fair Housing Act1 (FHA), as amended 
by the Violence Against Women Act2 (VAWA). Municipal crime-free 
housing ordinances, much like the crime-free housing provisions in the 
FHA, are designed to prevent and limit crime in residential areas by 
allowing, and sometimes requiring, landlords to evict tenants when a 
crime occurs in or around the tenant’s home. Unfortunately, municipal 
crime-free housing ordinances have been used to evict victims of 
domestic violence who call the police and file orders of protection 
when their abuser attacks them in or around their home. In 2006, 
Congress added a provision to VAWA that amends the FHA and 
makes it illegal to evict a tenant because of domestic-violence-related 
incidents. Since this enactment in 2006, no court has yet addressed the 
validity of crime-free housing ordinances or the breadth of the FHA’s 
prohibition on eviction based on domestic violence, but commentators 
have suggested the protection against eviction for domestic violence 
victims only applies to people living in federally subsidized housing.3 
                                                 
 
* Associate, Kirkland & Ellis LLP. J.D., University of Chicago Law School, 2013; 
B.A., Stanford University, 2008. I am exceedingly grateful to Professor Aziz Z. Huq 
of the University of Chicago Law School for his guidance and support of this project. 
Great thanks to Professors Naomi Schoenbaum and Laura Weinrib for their helpful 
comments. All errors are mine alone.  
1
 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2013); 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (c)(9)(B) - (c)(9)(C)(i) ( 2013). 
2
 Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109–162, 119 Stat 2960. 
3
 See Meris L. Bergquist, After the Violence: Using Fair Housing Laws to Keep 
Women and Children Safe at Home, 34 VER. B. J. & L. DIG. 46, 47 (2008); Jenifer 
Knight & Maya Raghu, Advancing Housing Protections for Victims of Domestic 
Violence, 36 COLO. LAW. 77, 79 (2007); Rebecca Licavoli Adams, Note, California 
Eviction Protections for Victims of Domestic Violence: Additional Protections or 
Additional Problems?, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 1, 14 (2012); Elizabeth M. 
Whitehorn, Comment, Unlawful Evictions of Female Victims of Domestic Violence: 
Extending Title VII’s Sex Stereotyping Theories to the Fair Housing Act, 101 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1419, 1449 (2007). 
2014] Wroe 125 
 
As a result women in private housing have continued to be evicted 
because of incidents of domestic violence.4  
Domestic violence is a serious and ongoing problem in the United 
States. Although both men and women are victims of domestic 
violence, women constitute the vast majority of victims. “Women 
account for approximately 85 percent of the victims of domestic 
violence, and they account for about 80 percent of the some 10.2 
million people who have been stalked at some point in their lives.”5 It 
is hard to know exactly how many people suffer from domestic 
violence because of underreporting, but it is estimated that domestic 
violence “potentially affects the lives of an astonishing number of 
American women[. R]esearch estimates there are four million 
incidents of domestic violence in the United States each year, and one 
in three women will experience domestic violence in their lifetime.”6 
Additionally, although rates of domestic violence do vary by race and 
socio-economic status, women of all races and income levels report 
experiencing domestic violence.7 Since crime-free housing ordinances 
were developed by the Mesa Arizona Police Department in 1992, they 
have spread to over 2,000 cities in 44 states.8 Given that domestic 
violence continues to plague many citizens and crime-free housing 
ordinances, which can be used to evict these victims, are spreading, 
something must be done to ensure domestic violence victims are not 
victimized a second time through eviction as a result of their abusers’ 
actions.  
Currently, lawyers and advocates attempt to protect these victims 
from eviction through claims of disparate treatment and disparate 
impact. However, this approach is inadequate both because of the 
uncertainty of the legality of these arguments9 and because it is 
extremely difficult to prove these claims given the high burden the 
petitioner carries under these legal theories. Additionally, the current 
academic interpretation of the FHA, as amended by VAWA, and the 
                                                 
 
4
 See, e.g., Metro N. Owners, LLC v. Thorpe, 870 N.Y.S.2d 768 (NY. Civ. Ct. 
2008). 
5
 Knight & Raghu, supra note 3, at 77. 
6
 Adams, supra note 3, at 1. 
7
 Shannan Castalano, Intimate Partner Violence in the U.S., BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipuvs.pdf (last modified Dec. 19, 2007).  
8
 See INTERNATIONAL CRIME FREE ASSOCIATION, www.crime-free-association.org 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2012). 
9
 The Supreme Court agreed to hear a case deciding the validity of disparate impact 
analysis in the Fair Housing Act context in Magner v Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 
(2011), but it was dismissed by Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012). 
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prevalent argument that protections for domestic violence victims 
apply only to those victims living in public housing is problematic.10  
First, this limited reading of the VAWA amendment to the FHA 
reflects biases about the occurrence of domestic violence. Domestic 
violence occurs regardless of race or socio-economic status, and by 
assuming Congressional protections for domestic violence only reach 
those families living in public housing, there is an inaccurate 
assumption that domestic violence only occurs in those homes. 
Second, this reading of the FHA requires domestic violence victims 
living in private housing to bring individual claims of discrimination 
rather than offering them broad protection under the FHA. Requiring 
each individual victim to show discrimination rather than using a 
broad legal attack on crime-free housing ordinances through the FHA 
involves putting the same type of burden on the domestic violence 
victims that the 2006 VAWA amendments to FHA tried to avoid.  
Most importantly, the plain text of the FHA suggests it applies to all 
housing, not just public housing. This comment proposes an 
alternative and superior solution to prevent evictions of domestic 
violence victims. 
This comment analyzes the interaction between the federal law 
provisions of the FHA, as amended by VAWA, and a set of municipal 
crime-free housing ordinances in circumstances of domestic violence 
where the likely effect of applying the crime-free ordinance will be the 
eviction of domestic violence victims. The relevant, operative 
provision in the FHA, 42 U.S.C. §1437f, should be read to apply to the 
entire breadth of housing covered by the FHA, both private and public. 
Although the provision is under a heading referencing low-income 
housing, the plain text of the provision does not distinguish public 
from private housing. Therefore, even in the absence of a crime-free 
housing ordinance, eviction because of domestic violence is illegal in 
private and public housing under the FHA. Additionally, the FHA has 
an express preemption provision triggered by §1437f; therefore, it 
preempts the local crime-free housing ordinances in question.  
However, given commentators’ interpretations11 of 42 U.S.C. 
§1437f and the Supreme Court’s recent difficulty articulating a clear 
rule for interpreting express preemption provisions12, it is not enough 
to simply say the express preemption provision prevents municipal 
crime-free housing ordinances from evicting victims of domestic 
                                                 
 
10
 See Bergquist, supra note 3, Knight & Raghu, supra note 3, Adams, supra note 3,  
Whitehorn, supra note 3. 
11
 Id.  
12
 See Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 91 (2008) (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
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violence. In this comment, I will explain why the express preemption 
provision should apply, but also, why, even without it, the municipal 
crime-free housing ordinances should fail under conflict preemption. 
That is, it is impossible to comply with both a municipal crime-free 
housing ordinance and the FHA. Therefore, the federal regulation 
preempts the municipal ordinance using the theory of conflict 
preemption.  
At a minimum, crime-free housing ordinances and the FHA, as 
amended by VAWA, work toward divergent purposes. The FHA 
prohibits criminal activity relating to domestic violence as a basis for 
eviction while municipal crime-free housing ordinances allow, and 
sometimes require, this same activity to cause eviction.  
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
The FHA makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent … or 
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because 
of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”13 These 
prohibitions extend to private14 and public housing, as well as rented 
or owned property.15 The FHA “prohibits discrimination by direct 
providers of housing, such as landlords and real estate companies as 
well as other entities, such as municipalities, banks, . . . and 
homeowners insurance companies whose discriminatory practices 
make housing unavailable. . . .”16  
Alleged violations of the FHA can be brought through several 
different mechanisms. The Department of Justice (DOJ) may bring 
lawsuits where there is reason to believe a landlord or other entity is 
engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination or where a denial of 
rights to a group of persons raises an issue of public importance.17 
Individuals are also able to bring complaints through the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) if they believe they have 
been the victims of illegal housing practices.18 It is not clear whether 
                                                 
 
13
 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2013). 
14
 There is an exception whereby the FHA does not apply to rooms or units in 
dwellings containing living quarters occupied by no more than four families if the 
owner maintains and occupies one of the living quarters as his/her residence. This is 
known as the “Mrs. Murphy exception” and is an affirmative defense against a claim 
of discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (2013). 
15
 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2013). 
16
 Fair Housing Act, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/housing_coverage.php (last visited July 8, 
2012). 
17
 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5 (2013). 
18
 See 42 U.S.C. § 1404a (2013). 
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an individual could raise an express preemption claim in a HUD 
complaint. That said, individuals might also file their own lawsuit in 
federal or state court. Finally, DOJ may bring cases on behalf of 
individuals based on referrals from HUD.19  
In 1988, Congress added a zero tolerance policy to housing laws as 
a response to the problem of rampant drug activity in public housing.20 
The policy gave “housing authorities the discretion to terminate the 
lease of a tenant when a member of the household or a guest engages 
in drug-related activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew, or 
should have known, of the drug-related activity.”21 Eight years later, 
President Clinton urged Congress to strengthen the crime-free housing 
provisions by enacting a one strike policy.22 With a “one strike and 
you’re out” policy, landlords would be able to more quickly evict 
tenants based on either their own criminal conduct or the conduct of 
other persons under their control.23 The One Strike Law24 provided 
public housing authorities with discretion to evict tenants for the drug 
or criminal activity of household members or guests that occurs on, in, 
or around the housing unit.25 Importantly, this law allowed no-fault 
evictions following drug-related crime or any criminal activity by any 
member of the family.26 This policy was immediately challenged by 
individuals who argued the FHA could only be used to evict tenants 
who themselves participated in or encouraged criminal activity. 
In Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker,27 
the Court held that the FHA in “42 U.S.C. §1437d(l)(6) 
unambiguously requires lease terms that vest local public housing 
authorities with the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related 
activity of household members and guests whether or not the tenant 
knew, or should have known, about the activity.”28 Because 42 U.S.C. 
§1437d(l)(6) is not limited to drug-related criminal activity, post-
                                                 
 
19
 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5 (2013). 
20
 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5101, 102 Stat. 4181, 
4300. 
21
 Adams, supra note 3, at 13. 
22
 President William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on 
the State of the Union (Jan. 23, 1996), available at http://www. 
Presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53091. 
23
 Whitehorn, supra note 3, at 1421. 
24
 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5101, 102 Stat. 4181, 4300. 
25
 Id. 
26
 The statute includes “any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right 
to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants. . . .” 42 U.S.C. 
§1437f(o)(7)(D) (2013). 
27
 535 U.S. 125 (2002). 
28
 Id. at 130. 
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Rucker courts have condoned no-fault evictions for criminal activity 
beyond drug-related activity such that, “[a]ny violent criminal activity 
on or near the premises by a tenant, household member, or guest, or 
any such activity on the premises by any other person under the 
tenant’s control” is grounds for eviction.29  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Rucker opened the door for 
municipal crime-free housing ordinances that allow no-fault evictions 
and provided a model for municipalities who wanted to mimic these 
provisions of the FHA in an attempt to reduce crime related activity in 
their municipalities. Just as Congress, in enacting the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1988, strived to create public housing that was “decent, safe, 
and free from illegal drugs,” so too did municipalities that wanted to 
eliminate drug use and drug sales in their neighborhoods and housing 
complexes.30 In enacting municipal crime-free housing ordinances, 
municipalities sought to extend the FHA’s no-fault eviction policies to 
private housing. Implicit in Rucker is the idea that no matter the level 
of culpability, tenants who cannot control the criminal activities of 
household members or guests can lose the privilege of public housing. 
For example, “[b]ecause of rampant drug abuse and criminal activity 
in public housing complexes, Congress provided housing authorities 
with discretion to reduce crime through harsh measures, such as 
evicting whole families.”31 Now, private landlords and municipalities 
“have emulated federal law, utilizing zero tolerance lease provisions 
that similarly allow them to evict tenants for the criminal actions of 
their guests or others under their control.”32 Importantly, these 
municipal ordinances often require landlords to have a no-fault 
eviction policy in order to operate rental properties within the 
municipality.33 As applied to domestic violence victims, this means the 
victim of abuse is sanctioned for the crime committed by her abuser.  
                                                 
 
29
 24 C.F.R. § 982.310 (2010); see Whitehorn, supra note 3, at 1421; see also Walter 
Reed Mews Ltd. P’ship. v. Wilkins, No. 2005-LTB-29799, 2006 WL 3043114, at 
*10-11 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 2006) (stating that if a lease addendum prohibits 
specific behavior, that behavior is cause for eviction, and “on or near” includes 
shared areas like lobbies, lawns, hallways, etc.). 
30
 42 U.S.C. § 11901 (West 1999). 
31
 Eliza Hirst, Note, The Housing Crisis for Victims of Domestic Violence: Disparate 
Impact Claims and Other Housing Protection for Victims of Domestic Violence, 10 
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 131, 140 (2003). 
32
 Whitehorn, supra note 3, at 1421. 
33
 See, e.g., COUNTRY CLUB HILLS, ILL. MUNI. CODES ch. 13, art. 36, § 11 (2008), 
available at http://www.countryclubhills.org/uploadedFiles/13-
Business%20Licensing.pdf#page=119; ORLAND PARK, ILL., VILLAGE OF ORLAND 
PARK VILLAGE CODE § 5-8-3-2 (2013), available at 
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Illinois/orlandpark_il/villageoforlandparkvi
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Although the type of crime one-strike policies seek to limit is 
typically not domestic violence related, “one-strike policies and zero 
tolerance lease provisions have been used by public and private 
landlords across the country to evict female domestic violence victims 
because of the criminal actions of their abusers.”34 Following Rucker, 
there were several nationally publicized no-fault evictions of domestic 
violence victims who violated their lease agreements as a result of 
being abused.35 “Landlords defend their right to evict victims of 
domestic violence by citing the need to protect the health and safety of 
neighboring tenants and the right of these neighbors to peaceful 
living.”36 Property managers claimed fellow residents suffer from 
being surrounded by violent acts and that “victims of domestic 
violence do not take steps to prevent a recurrence of violent acts,” 
which in turn causes other tenants to witness the violence again and 
again.37 Property managers also claim victims of domestic violence 
allow dangerous people (their abusers) onto the premises which puts 
their fellow tenants at risk.38  
Congress sought to address the unintended consequence of 
allowing no-fault evictions of domestic violence victims by amending 
the FHA through VAWA and prohibiting eviction based on domestic 
violence. In 1994, Congress passed VAWA, which recognized and 
addressed for the first time the problem of violence against women 
(domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking) on a national level. 
The new legislation appropriated federal funding for the investigation 
and prosecution of violent crimes against women.39 Additionally, “it 
strengthened criminal laws and penalties, and provided funding for 
various grant programs to train police and prosecutors, to create and 
support shelters, to support victim assistance programs and service 
providers, and to create and maintain the National Domestic Violence 
Hotline.” 40 VAWA was reauthorized in 200041 and 200542. 
                                                                                                                   
 
llagecode?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:orlandpark_il; OAK 
FOREST, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 117.42 (2013), available at http://www.oak-
forest.org/UserFiles/File/Police_Files/Crime_Free_Housing/Crime_Free_Ordinance_
Update_09-18-13.pdf. 
34
 Whitehorn, supra note 3, at 1421. 
35
 See, e.g., Bouley v. Young-Sabourin, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675 (D. Vt. 2005); Alvera v. 
CBM Consent Decree, CV 01-857-PA1 (D. Or. Nov. 5, 2001), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/alvera-v-cbm-group-federal-consent-decree. 
36
 Whitehorn, supra note 3, at 1421. 
37
 See id. at 1421-22. 
38
 Id. at 1422. 
39
 See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, § 40605, 108 Stat. 1952 (1994). 
40
 Knight & Raghu, supra note 3, at 79. 
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Although it was delayed, VAWA was most recently reauthorized in 
2013.43 Leading up to the 2005 amendments, there was concern about 
the number of women being evicted or denied housing because of their 
status as domestic violence victims.   
In 2005, the Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York 
investigated discriminatory practices in several New York state private 
housing markets including Staten Island, Brooklyn, and Queens.44 
Testers searched for available units through various advertisements. 
When a tester called to inquire about the unit, she would first verify 
the advertised unit was available and then would explain she was a 
housing coordinator for a survivor-assistance organization and that a 
survivor of domestic violence would be renting the unit. The study 
found that twenty percent of those contacted voiced “stereotypical 
concerns with questions and comments such as to the potential renter’s 
mental stability and concern for safety of the renter, other tenants, and 
the housing providers themselves.”45 An additional twenty-seven 
percent of those contacted refused to rent a unit to a survivor of 
domestic violence or failed to follow up as promised.46 The testers 
noted that a typical response was, “We don’t want her husband to 
come and beat her up.”47 Owners and landlords who refused to rent to 
survivors of domestic violence or who evicted tenants after incidents 
of domestic violence in the home typically were concerned about 
                                                                                                                   
 
41
 See Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, Div. B, 114 Stat. 
1491. In United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the Supreme Court struck 
down the civil rights remedy of VAWA on federalism grounds. The majority opinion 
suggests domestic violence is a problem for the states, but it seems illogical to claim 
the federal government has no interest in protecting domestic violence victims from 
harsh or unfair treatment because of their status as domestic violence victims. 
42
 See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960. 
43
 See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. 113-4, 127 
Stat. 54. 
44
 The study was conducted in response to Mayor Bloomberg and City Council 
blocking legislation that would make it illegal for New York City housing providers 
to discriminate against domestic violence victims. See Anti-Discrimination Center of 
Metro New York, Adding Insult to Injury: Housing Discrimination Against 
Survivors of Domestic Violence 1 (Aug. 2005), 
http://www.antibiaslaw.com/sites/default/files/files/DVReport.pdf. 
45
 Kristen M. Ross, Eviction, Discrimination and Domestic Violence: Unfair 
Housing Practices Against Domestic Violence Survivors, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S 
L.J. 249, 250 (2007). 
46
 Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York, supra note 44, at 2. 
47
 Id. at 3. 
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victims endangering the safety of other tenants and believed domestic 
violence victims were more likely to cause property damage.48 
Evictions of domestic violence victims and reports of housing 
discrimination fed the growing concern that because “many victims of 
domestic violence who leave their abusers have no alternative place to 
live, they often become homeless.”49 When Congress reauthorized 
VAWA in 2005 they made a legislative finding that, “[t]here is a 
strong link between domestic violence and homelessness. Among 
cities surveyed, forty-four percent identified domestic violence as a 
primary cause of homelessness.”50 Importantly, nothing in the 
legislative record suggests that this finding was limited to domestic 
violence victims who are eligible for public housing. Based on the 
legislative history, it seems clear that Congress’s concern in amending 
the FHA through VAWA extended to domestic violence victims in 
public and private housing. 
To address these concerns, when VAWA was reauthorized in 
2005, Congress added specific provisions regarding housing issues for 
victims of domestic violence. VAWA 2005 provided housing 
resources to help prevent victims from becoming homeless and to 
ensure victims could access the criminal justice system without 
jeopardizing their current or future housing options.51 The 2005 
amendments expressly forbid “applying the zero tolerance policy to 
criminal activity directly relating to domestic violence engaged in by a 
member of a tenant’s household or any guest or other person under the 
tenant’s control.”52 Congress believed no-fault eviction was especially 
harsh because victims of domestic violence generally have very little 
control over the actions of their abusers. Notably, the amendments did 
not prohibit landlords from terminating tenancy if repeated violence 
created an “actual and imminent threat” to other tenants or housing 
employees.53 
Domestic violence victims often find it can be incredibly difficult 
to sever ties with an abuser. The cycle of abuse makes it difficult to 
permanently end an abusive relationship and so violence may continue 
                                                 
 
48
 Ross, supra note 45, at 251 noted in Wendy R. Weiser & Geoff Boehm, Housing 
Discrimination Against Victims of Domestic Violence, 35 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 708, 
709 (2002). 
49
 Hirst, supra note 31, at 132. 
50
 See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 
2005, Pub. L. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960. 
51
 See The Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act 
of 2005 H.R. 3402, NATIONAL TASKFORCE TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN, available at http://nnedv.org/downloads/Policy/VAWA2005Summary.pdf. 
52
 Id. at 14. 
53
 Whitehorn, supra note 3, at 1423. 
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in the home for a long time. Even when the abuser no longer lives at 
the home, they may come by to visit for a number of reasons such as 
picking up and dropping off children, picking up and dropping off toys 
or clothes, or discussing children’s medical or school decisions.54  
In recent years, several municipalities across the United States 
have passed crime-free housing ordinances which require lease 
addendums that allow, and sometimes require, landlords to evict 
tenants when criminal activity occurs in or around their home.55 Some 
of these ordinances specifically list domestic violence as “criminal 
activity” that could give rise to eviction.56 The text of these ordinances 
varies from city to city, but they are generally based on a Crime-Free 
Housing program developed at the Mesa Arizona Police Department in 
1992.57 Since then, crime-free programs have spread to nearly 2,000 
cities in 44 states.58 Given the increasing popularity of crime-free 
housing ordinances and their potentially harmful consequences for 
domestic violence victims,59 federal preemption analysis is a critical 
defense against these laws, as applied to domestic violence victims. 
Moreover, the degree of federal protection from eviction for domestic 
                                                 
 
54
 Adams, supra note 3, at 22. 
55
 See, e.g., COUNTRY CLUB HILLS, ILL. MUNI. CODES ch. 13, art. 36, § 11 
(2008), available at http://www.countryclubhills.org/uploadedFiles/13-
Business%20Licensing.pdf#page=119; ORLAND PARK, ILL., VILLAGE OF 
ORLAND PARK VILLAGE CODE § 5-8-3-2 (2013), available at 
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Illinois/orlandpark_il/villageoforlandparkvi
llagecode?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:orlandpark_il; OAK 
FOREST, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 117.42 (2013), available at 
http://www.oak-
forest.org/UserFiles/File/Police_Files/Crime_Free_Housing/Crime_Free_Ordinanc
e_Update_09-18-13.pdf. 
56
 See, e.g., RICHTON PARK, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1467.12(c)(3)(O) (2010) 
available at 
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Illinois/richtonpark_il/villageofrichtonparki
llinoiscodifiedordi?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:richtonpark_il; 
Fort Worth, Tex., Ordinance 19998-12-2011 (Dec. 2012) available at 
http://fortworthtexas.gov/uploadedFiles/City_Secretary/City_Council/Official_Docu
ments/2011_Ordinances/19998-12-2011.pdf. 
57
 The example lease addendum includes a zero tolerance policy for violations of the 
lease regardless of whether the violation is committed by a tenant or guest. Among 
the reasons for eviction are “threatening or intimidating” and “assault,” as well as 
“any breach of the lease agreement that otherwise jeopardizes the health, safety and 
welfare of the landlord, his agent, or other tenant, or involving imminent or actual 
serious property damage…” Crime Free Lease Addendum Arizona Version, CRIME 
FREE ASSOCIATION, www.crime-free-
association.org/lease_addendums_az_english.htm.  
58
 See CRIME FREE ASSOCIATION, www.crime-free-association.org (last visited Nov. 
21, 2012). 
59
 See infra Part II. 
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violence victims is of acute importance because of the legal 
uncertainty of disparate impact liability under the FHA. 
 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW AND CURRENT LEGAL 
ARGUMENTS 
 
In January 2006, President Bush signed the Violence Against 
Women Act and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 
(VAWA 2005) which amended the statute to prohibit landlords from 
evicting or otherwise denying housing to victims of domestic violence, 
dating violence, and stalking.60  
The FHA, as amended by VAWA, now includes a provision 
prohibiting eviction of domestic violence victims. The Reauthorization 
Act states: 
 
An incident of actual or threatened domestic 
violence, dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking 
shall not be construed as a serious or repeated 
violation of a lease for housing assisted under a 
covered housing program by the victim or 
threatened victim of such incident.61 
 
It goes on to state: 
 
No person may deny assistance, tenancy, or 
occupancy rights to housing assisted under a 
covered housing program to a tenant solely on the 
basis of criminal activity directly relating to 
domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, 
or stalking that is engaged in by a member of the 
household of the tenant or any guest or other person 
under the control of the tenant, if the tenant or an 
affiliated individual of the tenant is the victim or 
threatened victim of such domestic violence, dating 
violence, sexual assault or stalking.62 
Currently, domestic violence victims who are evicted from private 
housing as a result of the violence they suffer in their home turn to 
                                                 
 
60
 See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 
127 Stat. 54.  
61
 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 
41411(b)(1)-(2)(A), 127 Stat. 54, 102-03. 
62
 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 
41411(b)(3), 127 Stat. 54, 103. 
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either disparate treatment or disparate impact theories under the FHA 
to fight their eviction.63 These theories can be arduous for the plaintiff 
because of the burden-shifting approach and the requirement of 
showing either discriminatory intent or discriminatory treatment. 
Additionally, because the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue 
of disparate impact and disparate treatment claims under the FHA, 
there is no clear standard to apply.64 Finally, disparate impact, the 
more lenient of the two approaches, may not be an acceptable standard 
under the FHA. The Supreme Court granted certiorari but did not hear 
a case that would have decided this matter.65 Therefore, plaintiffs face 
uncertainty in bringing these claims. This section explains how 
disparate treatment and disparate impact theories have been used in 
fighting evictions of domestic violence victims. However, given the 
uncertainty of the validity of these arguments, statutory interpretation 
and preemption arguments (discussed in the next section) may be more 
persuasive.66 
 
A. Disparate Treatment 
 
The FHA’s core provision makes it illegal to “refuse to sell or rent. 
. . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person 
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national 
origin.”67 While this language does not explicitly protect survivors of 
domestic violence from discriminatory housing practices, courts have 
recognized that victims may have a case for sex discrimination under 
                                                 
 
63
 It is not clear why this has been the dominant approach. It may be because the 
protections in the FHA for domestic violence victims are under the heading “Low-
income housing” and advocates have therefore, incorrectly, assumed these 
protections are not available to domestic violence victims in private housing. 
64
 Three circuits use a burden-shifting approach, four circuits use balancing test, and 
two circuits use a hybrid approach. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v Rizzo, 564 
F.2d 126, 148–49 (3d Cir. 1977) (using the burden-shifting approach); Arthur v. City 
of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 574–75 (6th Cir. 1986); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 
F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington 
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290–92 (7th Cir. 1977) (using a balancing test). The 
Supreme Court agreed to hear a case deciding the validity of disparate impact 
analysis in the Fair Housing Act context in Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 
(2012) (Mem.) but it was dismissed by Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012) 
(Mem.). 
65
 See Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548  (2011) (Mem.) cert. dismissed Magner v. 
Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012) (Mem.). 
66
 See infra Part IV. 
67
 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 
41411, 127 Stat. 54. 
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the theory of disparate treatment and/or disparate impact because 
domestic violence disproportionately affects women.68 
Plaintiffs can bring discrimination cases under the FHA using a 
theory of disparate treatment as long as they can demonstrate a 
discriminatory motive based on sex.69 A prima facie case is made, 
under the McDonnell Douglas framework70, in a disparate treatment 
case if the plaintiff can demonstrate that (a) he or she is a member of a 
protected class and (b) he or she was treated differently (c) because of 
their status as a member of a protected class.71 Once a plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to 
the defendant to prove a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its 
action.72 If the defendant is able to do so, the burden shifts back to the 
plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason asserted by the defendant is 
mere pretext.73 In the case of domestic violence, the victim would need 
to show she was evicted because she is a woman or that she was 
denied housing because she is a woman.74 Since proving 
discriminatory motive is difficult and often requires so-called 
“smoking gun” evidence, using disparate treatment is not a very 
common strategy. 
Disparate treatment theory was used however in Bouley v. Young-
Sabourn75 where Ms. Bouley filed a complaint against her landlord 
after she was evicted. Her complaint alleged unlawful termination of 
her lease under the FHA on the basis of sex. The complaint argued 
“the termination was initiated because she was a victim of domestic 
violence.”76 Bouley’s husband had assaulted her in their apartment, 
which led Bouley to call the police and apply for a restraining order.  
Three days later, Bouley’s landlord, Jacqueline Young-
Sabourin, with whom Bouley had no previous 
problems, served her with an eviction notice requiring 
her to leave her apartment within 30 days. The notice 
stated that Bouley violated the following clause in her 
lease: “Tenant will not use or allow said premises or 
                                                 
 
68
 See Michael R. Rand, National Crime Victimization Survey: Criminal 
Victimization, 2007, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Dec. 2008), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs.pdf. 
69
 Austin K. Hampton, Vouchers As Veils, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 503, 507 (2009). 
70
 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
71
 Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 305 (9th Cir. 1997). 
72
 Id. at 305. 
73
 Id. at 305; Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999). 
74
 See Ross, supra note 45, at 264–65. 
75
 Bouley v. Young-Sabourn, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675, 678 (D. Vt. 2005). 
76
 Id. 
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any part thereof to be used for unlawful purposes, in 
any noisy, boisterous or any other manner offensive to 
any other occupant of the building.”77  
This evidence was sufficient for the court to make out the prima facie 
case of disparate treatment. 
The district court in Vermont found the plaintiff demonstrated a 
prima facie case because throughout the case “it became clear that the 
landlord had acted intentionally, based on her belief in several false 
stereotypes about female victims of domestic violence, including 
belief that the victim was to blame for the violence.”78 The court 
reached this conclusion largely because of statements the landlord 
made to the domestic violence victim in the course of the eviction. 
Victim blaming often involves gender stereotyping because it centers 
on the belief that women provoke violence in men or “ask for it” by 
exhibiting behavior inconsistent with traditional gender roles. The 
evidence strongly supported the argument that Bouley was evicted 
because of her status as a victim of domestic violence and the belief 
that as a woman she was not doing enough to prevent the violence. 
“This was an important decision because it was the first time a federal 
court recognized the right of a female victim of domestic violence to 
pursue a claim of sex discrimination under the FHA.”79  
Although this legal approach worked in Bouley’s case, it is 
unlikely to be effective for the majority of domestic violence victims. 
Proving discriminatory intent is very difficult and landlords are 
unlikely to be as blatant about their discriminatory intentions as the 
landlord in the Bouley case. Additionally, with respect to the crime-
free housing ordinances, the intent is to prevent crime and therefore 
landlords have a legitimate argument that their intention was never 
based on sex discrimination but rather based on eliminating crime in 
their rental units. 
 
B. Disparate Impact 
 
Under the disparate impact theory of sex discrimination, a plaintiff 
would argue that the defendant’s actions had a discriminatory effect.80 
Unlike disparate treatment, disparate impact does not require any proof 
of discriminatory intent or motive to establish a claim. A prima facie 
case of disparate impact is established by showing the defendant’s 
                                                 
 
77
 Whitehorn, supra note 3, at 1419–20. 
78
 Id. 
79
 Bergquist, supra note 3, at 47. 
80
 Gamble, 104 F.3d at 306. 
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practices actually or predictably results in discrimination.81 To make 
out a prima facie case of discrimination under “disparate impact theory 
the plaintiff must show (1) the occurrence of certain outwardly neutral 
practices, and (2) a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on 
persons of a particular type produced by the defendant’s facially 
neutral acts or practices.”82 In the case of domestic violence, an 
evicted tenant could either claim the disproportionate impact is on 
domestic violence victims as a class or, more commonly, the 
disproportionate impact is on women as a class. It is more typical to 
argue there is a discriminatory effect on women because women are 
more likely than men to be victims of domestic violence and sex is a 
historically recognized class under disparate impact theories.83 
Several courts and agencies across the country have concluded that 
housing policies and practices that discriminate against victims of 
domestic violence disparately impact women and violate the sex 
discrimination provisions of the fair housing law.84 The National 
Housing Law Project, in its manual for attorneys and advocates, 
describes disparate impact theory as being especially effective in 
challenging eviction related to domestic violence because advocates 
can argue these policies have a disparate impact on women since most 
of the victims of domestic violence are women.85 One potential 
                                                 
 
81
 Id. 
82
 Pfaff v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 745 (9th Cir. 1996). 
83
 “Women account for approximately 85 percent of the victims of domestic 
violence, and they account for about 80 percent of the some 10.2 million people who 
have been stalked at some point in their lives.” Knight & Raghu, supra note 3, at 77. 
It is hard to know exactly how many people suffer from domestic violence because 
of underreporting but it is estimated that domestic violence “potentially affects the 
lives of an astonishing number of American women; research estimates there are 
four million incidents of domestic violence in the United States each year, and one in 
three women will experience domestic violence in their lifetime.” Adams, supra note 
3, at 1. 
84
 See e.g., Winsor v. Regency Property Mgm’t, Inc., No. 94 CV 2349 (Wisc. Cir. Ct. 
Oct. 2, 1995) (under Wisconsin fair housing law, modeled after the federal Fair 
Housing Act, a landlord’s single decision to refuse to rent an apartment to 
prospective tenants because they were victims of domestic violence was sufficient to 
state a sex discrimination claim under a disparate impact theory); O’Neil v. 
Karahlais, 13 M.D.L.R. 2004 (Mass. Comm’n Against Discrim. Oct. 21, 1991) 
(same with respect to Massachusetts law); Formal Op. No. 85-F15, 1985 N.Y. Op. 
Att’y Gen. 45 (1985) (denial of rentals to persons based on their status as domestic 
violence victims has a discriminatory impact on women and therefore violates sex 
discrimination provisions of New York State Human Rights Law); Knight & Raghu, 
supra note 3, at n. 27. 
85
 See Meliah Schultzman, NATIONAL HOUSING LAW PROJECT, Maintaining Safe and 
Stable Housing for Domestic Violence Survivors: A Manual for Attorneys and 
Advocates, at 26 (2012), available at 
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weakness in this argument is that disparate impact could be difficult to 
demonstrate when a landlord has only a few properties and therefore 
may have only ever evicted one or two tenants. Additionally, a 
defendant landlord will likely give some pre-textual reason for 
eviction once it becomes generally known that eviction based on 
domestic violence is not allowed. Finally, it would be impossible for a 
petitioner to make a disparate impact claim if she was the only female 
tenant the landlord had ever evicted. 
Disparate impact theory was used in 2001 in a case in Oregon. In 
Alvera v. CBM Group86, Ms. Alvera filed a complaint with HUD after 
being evicted from her home following an incident of domestic 
violence. After an investigation, HUD issued a finding of 
discrimination in violation of the FHA. HUD reasoned that since 
women constitute a vast majority of domestic violence victims, 
policies targeted at domestic violence survivors have a 
disproportionate impact on women and therefore such policies 
constitute discrimination and are illegal under the FHA.87 The parties 
settled the matter and CBM Group (the owners of the apartment 
complex) agreed not to evict or discriminate against tenants because of 
the domestic violence committed against them.88 “The hearing officer 
found that the landlord’s policy of evicting the victim as well as the 
perpetrator of an incident of violence between household members had 
a disparate impact based on sex, due to the disproportionate number of 
female victims of domestic violence.”89  
Until now, domestic violence victims like Ms. Alvera have 
resorted to disparate impact theories of liability under the FHA as a 
shield against eviction but, most of the time, such an argument was not 
successful.90 Some victims of domestic violence may not be able to 
                                                                                                                   
 
http://www.nhlp.org/files/NHLP%20Domestic%20Violence%20and%20Housing%2
0Manual%202.pdf.  
86
 Consent Decree, Alvera v. C.B.M. Group, No. CV 01-857-PA (D. Or. Nov. 5, 
2001). 
87
 See Complaint in Intervention and Demand for Jury Trial at 9, Alvera v. CBM 
Group, Inc., No. CV 01-857-PA (D. Or. Nov. 5, 2001). 
88
 See Consent Decree at 5, Alvera v. CBM Group Inc., No. CV 01-857-PA (D. Or. 
Nov. 5, 2001). 
89
 Adams, supra note 3, at 29 (internal quotations omitted). 
90
 See, e.g., Winsor v. Regency Property Mgm’t, Inc., No. 94 CV 2349 (Wisc. Cir. 
Ct. Oct. 2, 1995) (under Wisconsin fair housing law, modeled after the federal Fair 
Housing Act, a landlord’s single decision to refuse to rent an apartment to 
prospective tenants because they were victims of domestic violence was sufficient to 
state a sex discrimination claim under a disparate impact theory); O’Neil v. 
Karahlais, 13 M.D.L.R. 2004 (Mass. Comm’n Against Discrim. Oct. 21, 1991) 
(same with respect to Massachusetts law); Formal Op. No. 85-F15, 1985 N.Y. Op. 
Att’y Gen. 45 (1985) (denial of rentals to persons based on their status as domestic 
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bring disparate impact claims “because they may be unable to find 
other such victims in their apartment buildings who were similarly 
evicted and thus unable to fulfill the usual requirement for statistical 
analysis in disparate impact cases.”91 The victim would instead have to 
prove under disparate treatment that “she was treated differently than 
similarly situated male tenants, or that the housing provider’s action 
stemmed from gender based stereotypes about battered women.”92 
Additionally, there is reason to believe the Supreme Court may see the 
law differently. Although every circuit court considering the issue has 
found disparate impact theory to be a valid claim, the Supreme Court 
has not addressed a case of disparate impact discrimination under the 
FHA. Therefore, the exact standards governing the theory are still 
unknown. Moreover, the Supreme Court recently decided to hear a 
case arguing that theories of disparate impact are not available under 
the FHA.93 In Magner v. Gallagher,94 the Supreme Court was going to 
consider whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the 
FHA and, if such claims are cognizable, whether they should be 
analyzed under a burden-shifting test, a balancing test, or some sort of 
hybrid approach. However, the case was dismissed on February 14, 
2012 and the matter remains unresolved.95 Although the Supreme 
Court will no longer hear Magner, the possibility that disparate impact 
claims may be unavailable under Title VII makes the preemption issue 
addressed by this comment extremely relevant.96 If advocates for 
domestic violence victims are no longer able to use disparate impact 
theory to fight evictions, it is not clear what legal theory they have 
available to them. Therefore, applying either express or conflict 
preemption to allow victims of domestic violence, particularly those 
living in private housing, to challenge the validity of their eviction is 
even more important at this time. 
To date, there has been no litigation regarding whether or not the 
FHA, as amended by VAWA, preempts crime-free housing 
                                                                                                                   
 
violence victims has a discriminatory impact on women and therefore violates sex 
discrimination provisions of New York State Human Rights Law). Knight & Raghu, 
supra note 3, at n. 27. 
91
 Knight & Raghu, supra note 3, at n. 27. 
92
 Id. at 30. 
93
 See supra note 64. It is worth noting the Supreme Court has become more hostile 
to disparate treatment claims more generally. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. 
Ct. 2658 (2009) (illustrating the Court’s hostility to disparate treatment in the 
employment context and Justice Scalia’s concurrence which seems to cast doubt on 
the constitutionality of disparate impact, at least in the context of race). 
94
 Magner, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (Mem.). 
95
 See Magner, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012) (Mem.). 
96
 See id. 
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ordinances.97 The preemption theory is more likely to be raised if 
advocates believe they are unable to use disparate impact liability 
under the FHA, since the preemption theory need not rely on disparate 
impact. Moreover, the preemption argument requires fewer resources 
than a disparate impact argument since it does not necessitate any 
inquiry into the motives of landlords who evict domestic violence 
victims.98 
 
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND PREEMPTION ANALYSIS AS A 
LEGAL DEFENSE TO EVICTION 
 
This article imagines two circumstances in which a victim of 
domestic violence, living in private housing, might be evicted as a 
result of the abuse committed against her. In the first circumstance, the 
municipality has no crime-free housing ordinance and the landlord 
evicts the tenant pursuant to the landlord’s own lease requirements, 
which were not required by the municipality. In the second 
circumstance, the municipality has passed a crime-free housing 
ordinance that expressly allows or requires the landlord to evict tenants 
if there is a crime committed, including domestic violence, in or 
around the tenant’s home. In the first circumstance, without a crime-
free housing ordinance, the eviction is illegal by the plain terms of the 
FHA as amended by VAWA. In the second circumstance, the crime-
free housing ordinance is preempted by the express preemption clause 
of the FHA and alternatively under the theory of conflict preemption. 
 
A. Eviction Without a Crime-Free Housing Ordinance 
 
In the absence of a crime-free housing ordinance, if a victim of 
domestic violence is evicted from his or her home as a result of 
domestic violence occurring in the home, the eviction is illegal by the 
plain meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1437f (c)(9)(C)(i). The text of the 
provision does not specify its application to certain types of housing. 
Rather, the language added to the FHA by this amendment simply 
states that, “[c]riminal activity directly relating to domestic violence 
… engaged in by a member of a tenant’s household or any guest… 
shall not be cause for termination of … assistance, tenancy, or 
                                                 
 
97
 It is less clear whether the issue has been raised in the course of public housing 
litigation, but no case has been filed where the main complaint is a preemption 
argument. 
98
 For example, inquiring into the motive of the landlord may involve extensive 
discovery and interviewing other tenants about their experiences. 
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occupancy rights….”99 Although the provision is under the heading 
“Low-income housing assistance,” there is no reference to public 
housing in the text of the provision. To limit the application of this 
protection to domestic violence victims living in federally subsidized 
housing simply because of the section heading would be to diminish 
what Congress intended. If Congress were concerned about this 
protection applying only to public housing, they would have specified 
that by adding a phrase such as, “section 8 tenant.” Moreover, the use 
of the general noun, “the victim” suggests Congress was considering 
all victims of domestic violence, not just victims in public housing.100 
For example, they could have specified that domestic violence is not 
concerned a “violation of the lease by the section 8 tenant” rather than 
“by the victim or threatened victim.”101 
Additionally, the text of the provision lists separately “assistance,” 
“tenancy,” or “occupancy rights.” This enumeration suggests these are 
three separate things that may be in jeopardy under the zero tolerance 
policy of the FHA. If “assistance” covers the domain of public 
housing, it seems Congress included the addition of “tenancy,” to 
cover private housing as well as public housing. Finally, it seems 
strange to assume members of Congress, in their concern about 
domestic violence, would leave out the potential victims who live in 
private housing. Members of Congress, who are concerned about 
domestic violence, are likely concerned about the issue for all people, 
not just low-income people. The legislative history includes floor 
statements in support of amending the FHA to protect domestic 
violence victims in this way, and none of the comments refer 
exclusively to domestic violence victims in public housing. Rather, 
they reference domestic violence victims more broadly.102 
There are several administrative reasons Congress would have 
included this provision under the heading of “Low-income housing 
assistance.” For example, one of the factual findings Congress made in 
passing this legislation related specifically to the discrimination and 
                                                 
 
99
 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 
41411(b)(3), 127 Stat. 54, 103. 
100
 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 
Stat. 54. 
101
 Id. 
102
 See 151 Cong. Rec. H8401-02 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2005) (statement of Gingery), 
2005 WL 2384768, at *9 (stating that the reauthorization “creates stiffer penalties for 
abusers, and it gives more rights to the victims of domestic violence”); 151 Cong. 
Rec. H8401-02 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2005) (statement of Roybal-Allard), 2005 WL 
2384768, at *9 (stating that “domestic violence is recognized as a crime committed 
by the abuser, and not the fault of the victim). 
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eviction of women in public housing as a result of their status as 
domestic violence victims.103 Given this finding, Congress may have 
thought it logical to include this protection in the “Low-income 
housing assistance” subheading. But that does not change the fact that 
the provision itself, by its plain text, does not distinguish between 
public and private housing. There is a cannon of construction which 
states that “[t]itles do not control meaning; preambles do not expand 
scope; section headings do not change language.”104 Therefore, this 
provision should be read as applying to the entirety of the statute – 
applying to both public and private housing. 
 
B. Eviction With a Crime-Free Housing Ordinance 
 
If a tenant living in private housing is evicted because of domestic 
violence, pursuant to a crime-free housing ordinance, the tenant can 
argue the crime-free housing ordinance is invalid because the FHA 
preempts it. 
Article VI of the Constitution provides the laws of the United 
States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”105 The Supreme Court 
                                                 
 
103
 “Women and families across the country are being discriminated against, denied 
access to, and even evicted from public and subsidized housing because of their 
status as victims of domestic violence. A recent survey of legal service providers 
around the country found that these providers have responded to almost 150 
documented eviction cases in the last year alone where the tenant was evicted 
because of the domestic violence crimes committed against her. In addition, nearly 
100 clients were denied housing because of their status as victims of domestic 
violence.” Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act 
of 2005, Pub. L. 109–162 § 41401 119 Stat. 2960 (2006). 
104
 Otto J. Hetzel et al., Legislative Law and Process 693 (1980); see also, Bhd. of 
R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528 (1947) (“…the title of a 
statute and the heading of a section cannot limit the plain meaning of the text. For 
interpretive purposes, they are of use only when they shed light on some ambiguous 
word or phrase. They are but tools available for the resolution of a doubt. But they 
cannot undo or limit that which the text makes plain.”); Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr. 
v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998); Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of 
Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2216 (2012) (“Notwithstanding its 
colloquial title, therefore, the QTA plainly allows suit in circumstances well beyond 
‘bread-and-butter quiet title actions…’”); Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, 
Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 242 (2004) (holding that although the caption seems to be limited 
to “litigants,” “[s]ection 1782(a) plainly reaches beyond the universe of persons 
designated ‘litigant.’”); I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 308 (2001) (“While the title 
of § 401(e)—“Elimination of Custody Review by Habeas Corpus”—would seem to 
support the INS' submission, the actual text of that provision does not. As we have 
previously noted, a title alone is not controlling.”). 
105
 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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has held that “state law that conflicts with federal law is without 
effect.”106 When the Court considers an issue arising under the 
Supremacy Clause, there is a presumption that federal law should not 
supersede the historic police powers of the States unless that is the 
“clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”107 Congress’ purpose in 
enacting a law, which may conflict with state or local law, is the 
touchstone of preemption analysis.108 
Congressional intent may be explicitly stated in the statute’s 
language (i.e. explicit preemption) or implicitly contained in its 
structure and purpose (i.e. implicit preemption). Express preemption 
analysis has focused on finding the meaning of the language Congress 
used in drafting the preemption clause.109 Where Congress has 
considered and explicitly addressed the issue of preemption by 
including a specific provision, the Court does not need to infer 
Congressional intent to preempt state law that conflict with federal 
                                                 
 
106
 See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (internal quotations 
omitted). It is important to note that recently the Court has failed to articulate a clear 
standard for preemption. Ernest Young has described the Court’s failure to 
implement a consistent standard on preemption as a result of the Justices 
approaching preemption cases “as a mass of largely unrelated issues of statutory 
construction arising under different regulatory regimes.” However, Young believes 
the 2010 Roberts Court demonstrates the Justices beginning to “think about 
preemption as a matter of general principle” which he argues will result in a more 
consistent standard. Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The 
Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 253, 283 
(2011). 
107
 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (internal quotations omitted); see also Medtronic, Inc. 
v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
108
 See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485. However, this is complicated by the so-called 
“presumption against preemption” from the Court’s decision in Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator, 331 U.S. 218 (1947). See e.g., Williamson v. Mazda Motor, 131 S. Ct. 
1131 (2011) (although the court has not applied this presumption consistently); 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (applying the presumption in 
both express and implied preemption settings). See Young, supra note 106, at 278.  
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 Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and 
Interpretive Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1156 (1998). However, it is not always 
as simple as understanding the plain meaning of the express preemption provision. If 
there is any ambiguity in Congress’ intention, the Court may look further than the 
express preemption provision. In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun 
explained, “[t]he principles of federalism and respect for state sovereignty that 
underlie the Court’s reluctance to find preemption where Congress has not spoken 
directly to the issue apply with equal force where Congress has spoken, though 
ambiguously. In such cases, the question is not whether Congress intended to 
preempt state regulation, but to what extent. We do not, absent unambiguous 
evidence, infer a scope of preemption beyond that which is clearly mandated by 
Congress’ language.” Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 533. 
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law.110 Rather, the Court need only give the preemption clause “its 
ordinary meaning.”111 Preemptive intent may be inferred “if there is an 
actual conflict between the state and federal law.”112  
Implied preemption can occur when there is a conflict between 
federal and state law. This analysis focuses on whether it is possible 
for a party to comply with both federal and state requirements, “or 
whether a state law would sufficiently frustrate the objectives 
underlying federal law.”113  
 
1. Express Preemption Clause 
 
The FHA has an express preemption clause, which forbids state 
and local laws that permit discrimination against domestic violence 
victims. 42 U.S.C. § 3615 reads:  
 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to 
invalidate or limit any law of a State or political 
subdivision of a State, or of any other jurisdiction in 
which this subchapter shall be effective, that grants, 
guarantees, or protects the same rights as are 
granted by this subchapter; but any law of a State, a 
political subdivision, or other such jurisdiction that 
purports to require or permit any action that would 
be a discriminatory housing practice under this 
subchapter shall to that extent be invalid.114 
 
This express preemption provision indicates that municipal crime-
free housing ordinances, which permit and sometimes require eviction 
of domestic violence victims because of violence committed by their 
abusers in their home, are preempted by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437f (c)(9)(B) 
and (c)(9)(C)(i). If the preemption provision is given its ordinary 
meaning, as Justice Scalia instructs in his concurrence in Cipollone, 
municipal crime-free housing ordinances are invalid, as applied to 
domestic violence victims, because they conflict with the FHA.115 
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 See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517. 
111
 Id. at 548 (Scalia, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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 Altria Group, 555 U.S. at 76-77. 
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 Jordan, supra note 109. This is known as conflict preemption. 
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 42 U.S.C. § 3615 (2013). 
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VAWA amends the FHA to explicitly protect victims of domestic 
violence from eviction as a result of the violence perpetrated against 
them, and the FHA preempts municipal crime-free housing ordinances 
that allow such eviction. 
Recently, the Supreme Court has struggled to articulate a clear and 
concise test for evaluating preemption clauses.116 In particular, Justice 
Scalia’s concurrence in Cipollone117 and Justice Thomas’s dissent in 
Altria118 outline the Court’s internal disagreement regarding whether 
or not there is a presumption against preemption and the extent to 
which express preemption clauses should be evaluated narrowly or 
broadly. This paper does not seek to resolve those disputes or advocate 
one position over the other. Rather, I argue that regardless of the 
Court’s internal debate, express preemption clauses are interpreted 
first by their plain meaning.119 The FHA’s express preemption clause 
clearly prohibits eviction of domestic violence victims because they 
are a protected class within the FHA. 
That said, commentators have assumed the FHA’s protection of 
domestic violence victims exists only in low-income housing.120 
Moreover, attorneys have failed to raise the preemption issue in cases 
involving the eviction of domestic violence victims. To rebut the claim 
that VAWA amended the FHA to protect only victims of domestic 
violence residing in low-income housing, I will further argue that 
municipal crime-free housing ordinances are also preempted under 
theories of implied preemption as well, particularly conflict 
preemption. That is, even if the protections VAWA added to the FHA 
apply only to public housing, preemption may still apply. 
 
2. Conflict Preemption 
 
Conflict preemption exists when a federal statute is irreconcilable 
with a state or federal law, such that it is impossible to comply with 
both of them.121 In other words, conflict exists if a “state law ‘stands as 
                                                                                                                   
 
wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ 
preemptive intent.” Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 
1977 (2011). 
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 See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 544. 
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 See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); see also, Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
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an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress’.”122 Even if a federal statute does not 
contain an express preemption clause, it implicitly repeals whatever 
state law it contradicts. That is, when the “application of state law 
would inhibit the accomplishment of federal objectives” the state law 
is preempted through conflict preemption.123 
The plain meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437f (c)(9)(B) and (c)(9)(C)(i) 
makes it impossible to evict a domestic violence victim pursuant to a 
municipal crime-free housing ordinance and still be in compliance 
with federal law under the FHA. The statute explicitly states that “an 
incident or incidents of actual or threatened domestic violence … shall 
not be good cause for terminating … tenancy or occupancy rights of 
the victims of such violence.”124 Compliance with both the municipal 
and federal law is technically possible but enforcement of the 
municipal law would obstruct the purpose of the federal statute.125  
Landlords can accept Section 8 and private tenants within the same 
building. Thus, even if the protections against eviction for domestic 
violence victims apply only to Section 8 Housing Voucher recipients, 
enforcing a municipal crime-free housing ordinance against one tenant 
and not another despite both being domestic violence victims would 
obstruct the purpose of the protections the FHA creates for domestic 
violence victims. One of the motivating factors of amending the FHA 
to protect domestic violence victims from eviction was the concern 
that domestic violence victims and their children would face 
homelessness if evicted.126 Therefore, evicting a tenant, in public or 
private housing, as a result of the domestic violence she experiences, 
would obstruct the FHA’s purpose in protecting domestic violence 
victims. 
 No court has yet addressed the validity of crime-free housing 
ordinances or the breadth of the FHA’s prohibition on eviction based 
on domestic violence. In the limited literature on this topic, the 
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 Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 228 (2000). This is also 
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 See generally Violence Against Women and Department of Justice 
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-162 119 Stat. 2960 (2006).  
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amendment of the FHA through VAWA has been described by 
commentators as not extending to private housing and therefore not a 
prohibition of eviction as a result of domestic violence under 
municipal crime-free housing ordinances.127 Because the relevant 
sections of the FHA are under the heading of “Low-income housing 
assistance," they have been interpreted by a handful of commentators 
as applying to only women who reside in public housing.128 These 
commentators describe VAWA’s 2005 amendments and simply state, 
without citation or explanation, that their benefits are only applicable 
to domestic violence victims living in public housing.129 They posit 
that VAWA 2005’s “reach is limited to tenants living in public 
housing and government-assisted housing,”130 such that, “[v]ictims of 
domestic violence who reside in non-Section 8, private rentals are not 
covered by VAWA 2005.”131  
But, this interpretation is inaccurate. To interpret the relevant 
portions of the FHA as applying only to public housing is to misread 
the text of the provisions. The plain text does not require its 
application be limited to public housing. Additionally, this 
interpretation would create a perverse incentive for potential victims of 
domestic violence to remain in Section 8 housing for additional 
protections. Moreover, this interpretation ignores the express 
preemption provision at work in the FHA which invalidates crime-free 
housing ordinances.132 Finally, even if the statute only expressly 
protects domestic violence victims living in public housing, the 
municipal crime-free housing ordinances should still be preempted 
under the theory of conflict preemption. 
 
IV. COUNTER ARGUMENTS 
 
There are several counterarguments to the argument presented in 
this paper including legitimate concerns about reducing violence in 
shared housing areas. Some may argue that the amendment to the FHA 
should be construed as applying only to public housing because of the 
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sub-section’s heading. Alternatively, others may argue that local 
municipalities, rather than courts, should be responsible for amending 
crime-free housing ordinances to protect domestic violence victims if 
they deem that to be the appropriate course of action.  
 
A. Motivations of Crime-Free Housing 
 
The motivations behind the crime-free housing policies suggest 
that domestic violence may be precisely the type of crime Congress 
sought to keep out of housing situations. After all, domestic violence is 
a crime and can cause disturbance for other residents and potentially 
put them in danger.133 In enacting the One Strike policy, Congress and 
President Clinton seemed particularly interested in reducing drug 
related crime in public housing. But, arguably, reducing all crime, 
including domestic violence, was a motivating factor.134 Although 
safety concerns are legitimate, by passing VAWA, Congress has 
already made the judgment that protecting domestic violence victims’ 
housing rights was more important than the potential safety concerns 
they pose to other tenants. Such congressional determination should be 
respected. 
Additionally, domestic violence victims who lose housing are at 
increased risk of homelessness and Congress was particularly 
concerned about victims of domestic violence who are evicted because 
of crime-free housing policies and then become homeless as a 
result.135 It could be argued that low-income women are at particular 
risk of homelessness, and the exception to the One Strike policy for 
domestic violence victims was aimed at protecting these economically 
vulnerable domestic violence victims from eviction. Therefore, the 
economic concerns, which motivated the amendment, may not apply 
to women in private housing.136 However, as previously mentioned, 
the legislative history suggests that Congress was not exclusively 
considering women in public housing. Although Congress referred to 
public housing and voucher programs while considering VAWA 2005, 
the legislative history also includes references to HUD materials that 
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are applicable to both private and public housing. The legislative 
history also includes references to landlords as “housing or subsidy 
provider[s]” indicating some housing providers would not be receiving 
subsidies.137 Moreover, in floor statements supporting the 2005 
reauthorization of VAWA, several members of Congress referred to 
victims of domestic violence broadly, either as women or victims, and 
there is no record of victims being referred to by their economic 
status.138 
 
B. Emphasis on the Heading 
 
The amendment to the FHA preventing eviction based solely on 
domestic violence incidents was put under the heading “Low-income 
Housing Assistance” and presumably this is why commentators have 
read the amendment as applying only to victims in low-income 
housing.139 However, the text of the statute itself does not mention 
low-income housing or any particular type of housing. It simply refers 
to the tenant’s lease agreement. Additionally, as previously mentioned, 
there is a cannon of construction which states “[t]itles do not control 
meaning; preambles do not expand scope; section headings do not 
change language.”140 Therefore, reading the amendment to apply to the 
entire statute, and therefore to both public and private housing, is a 
legitimate reading. 
 
C. Municipalities Can Protect Domestic Violence Victims From 
Eviction 
 
While it is true that municipalities can pass their own exceptions to 
their crime-free housing ordinances, that does not change the ability of 
domestic violence victims evicted under this policy to raise the 
argument that they are protected under the FHA. Congress was 
concerned with the alarming correlation between homelessness and 
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domestic violence141 and chose to prevent all victims of domestic 
violence from being evicted based on the crime that was their abuse. A 
municipality is welcome to amend their crime-free housing ordinance 
to offer protection from eviction for domestic violence victims, but 
their failure to do so does not change the fact that Congress has 
already acted.  
Moreover, there is reason to believe municipalities would not make 
these changes. Some municipalities specifically list domestic violence 
as a trigger of the crime-free housing policy, so they are highly 
unlikely to make an exception for public housing.142 Additionally there 
may be collective action problems in organizing domestic violence 
victims and their advocates to successfully lobby each of the over 
2,000 municipalities that have enacted crime-free housing ordinances. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In 2006, in response to an unforeseen consequence of the One 
Strike policy, Congress amended the FHA through VAWA to prevent 
victims of domestic violence from being evicted as a result of the 
crimes committed against them. Unfortunately, the provision has been 
misread by commentators, though not courts, to apply only to domestic 
violence victims living in low-income housing. This article explains 
why the provision, by its plain meaning, applies to domestic violence 
victims in both private and public housing. Moreover, this paper 
argues that municipal crime-free housing ordinances are preempted as 
a result of the express preemption provision in the FHA and cannot be 
used to evict domestic violence victims. This new reading of the new 
Reauthorization Act of 2013 and the preemption argument outlined in 
the article are timely arguments because the reliability of disparate 
treatment and disparate impact claims under the FHA has been 
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questioned following the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in 
Magner v. Gallagher.143 
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